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The Myth of a Centralised Socialist State 
in Vietnam: What Kind of a Myth? 
Martin Gainsborough 
Abstract: Through a case study of Vietnam, the article explores the view 
that there is a tendency to overstate the degree to which there is a coher-
ent central body, namely the state, directing the country. Exploring this 
myth, it argues that there is a tendency to reify the state, even in writing 
which is attentive to localism and the diversity of societal actors at play 
in Vietnamese political life. The article argues that the myth of the cen-
tral state endures because there are domestic and foreign political inter-
ests that depend on it. However, more fundamentally, the myth endures 
because of the power of the state to colonise our minds such that even 
when the empirical data does not fit with the idea of the state, we make it 
fit. The article’s findings have implications for the study of politics far 
beyond the Vietnamese case. 
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Introduction 
This article explores the view that there is a tendency in Vietnam studies 
to overstate the degree to which there is a coherent central body, namely 
the state, directing the country.1 I argue that this is a myth that tends to 
surface and resurface over time. Having stated this as my point of depar-
ture, things get more complicated. Suggesting that such a myth is operat-
ing could mean many things. For instance, we might hesitate to say that 
there is no central body in Vietnam, not least because the formal political 
apparatus seems well developed. So, is it a case of the central state simply 
being weaker than is sometimes thought or is there something else at 
stake, as yet unidentified? In addition, the article’s title speaks of a cen-
tralised Socialist state. This raises the question of how the association of 
the Vietnamese state with Socialism might be relevant to an understand-
ing of the myth. Finally, it is worth noting that asserting the existence of 
a myth of a centralised state in Vietnam might seem counter-intuitive. If 
there is one thing that any self-respecting student of Vietnam politics 
knows, it is that localism is very important: recall the proverb ‘the em-
peror’s writ stops at the village gate’ (phep vua thua le lang) and the many 
studies that have explored the phenomena of localism in Vietnam.2 Thus, 
one might be forgiven for asking, ‘What risk of overstating the authority 
of the central state here?’ What is clear, therefore, is that having stated an 
initial position, it is necessary to proceed carefully and to establish very 
precisely the nature of the alleged myth. This is what the present article 
seeks to do.  
My key research questions can be identified as follows:  
1. What form does the myth of a centralised Socialist state in Vietnam 
take and how does it manifest itself? 
2. Is it a myth that manifests itself in the same way over time or do we 
need to take account of change? 
3. If there is evidence of a tendency to overstate the power of the 
central state in writing on Vietnam – in some shape or form – and 
this is mistaken, why does the myth endure? 
The latter question clearly takes us in the direction of the politics of the 
myth; to get a handle on the myth, it is important to understand the 
politics. However, I argue – having asserted the existence of the myth 
understood in a particular way – that while it does indeed endure for 
                                                 
1  Note that, when I refer to ‘the state’, I am thinking of the Communist Party 
and government.  
2  A good place to start is Kerkvliet and Marr (2004).  
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political reasons, its roots lie deeper, namely in the ‘statist bias’ that per-
meates large swathes of political science (and public life). By statist bias, I 
mean a tendency to take the state as a given and hence not appreciate 
how the state functions politically, affecting what we see and what we do 
not.3 Vietnam studies is, on the whole, in thrall to the statist bias, and it 
is about time we broke free from this. 
The article proceeds as follows. I first offer a discussion of ways in 
which we might think about the state. I do this with reference to some of 
the classic literatures that seek to theorise the state beyond the case of 
Vietnam. Second, looking at the work of a number of key Vietnam poli-
tics scholars, notably Benedict Kerkvliet, I explore how the said myth 
manifests itself. This will include addressing the question of how the 
myth of a centralised state can be operating in respect of a country where 
scholars are deeply attentive to localism and a vibrant societal sphere. 
Next, I consider the politics of the myth, asking why it endures. I focus 
on three areas: elite interests, the Socialist legacy, and ideas about the 
statist bias; arguing that the first and the third are most important. Hav-
ing done this, I propose an alternative ‘non-statist’ approach to thinking 
about politics in Vietnam that avoids some of the pitfalls associated with 
the myth. This is done with reference to work by both the author and 
Adam Fforde. Finally, in the conclusion, I consider the implications of 
my findings for contemporary actors, including the international devel-
opment community. 
The focus of the article is on the post-1975 period and particularly 
the period since the 1980s (that is, the so-called ‘reform’ years).4 That 
said, I will refer briefly to the period before 1975 where it is pertinent to 
do so. In terms of methodology, the article is based on a close analysis of 
existing Vietnam scholarship supplemented by the author’s own research 
on Vietnam, conducted over many years, and a reading of sections of the 
state theory literature. 
I now turn to the first section. 
  
                                                 
3  This is to draw on post-structuralist writing on the state, which is central to 
understanding the argument of this chapter. See Finlayson and Martin 2006: 
155–171. 
4  Note that the idea of ‘reform’ (doi moi) lies at the heart of the myth of the cen-
tralised state in Vietnam in the period under question, so I am hesitant to in-
voke such language here. The relationship between ‘reform’ and the myth is 
discussed later in the article.  
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Theorising the State: Some Initial Reflections 
It is not as if I am starting my investigations into the nature of the state 
in Vietnam entirely blind.5 In addition, there has been much considera-
tion given to the state both in political science and in development poli-
tics more generally. The aim of this section is to draw on this wider ‘non-
Vietnam’ literature to orientate ourselves and guide us in terms of some 
of the possibilities when we come to think about the Vietnamese case. 
The fundamental question is: how do we think about state power? 
In terms of the panoply of different kinds of states that exist, writ-
ing has ranged from discussion of ‘failed states’ to neo-patrimonial and 
developmental states, with various other conceptualisations along the 
way.6 Writing on failed states was particularly prominent in the post-Cold 
War period, and while the concept of the failed state has been rightly 
criticised, writing in this area seeks to communicate situations of partial 
or total state collapse, where the functions of governance carried out by 
a state cease to occur (see Hehir and Robinson 2007, and Jones 2008: 
180–205). I suggested in the introduction that this conceptualisation is 
probably not appropriate for Vietnam (there clearly is ‘something’ there). 
However, the idea of a failed state is useful for revealing the spectrum of 
what we could conceivably be talking about when we consider the myth 
of a centralised state – if only in this case to rule it out. 
By contrast, ideas of a neo-patrimonial or developmental state are 
potentially much more useful when it comes to thinking about Vietnam. 
The neo-patrimonial state has particularly been associated with sub-
Saharan Africa, so there has been some reticence to apply it to Vietnam; 
a standard response would be: ‘Vietnam is not as dysfunctional as some 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa’. However, convention aside, ideas about 
neo-patrimonialism are not without merit in terms of highlighting some 
characteristics that are in play in the Vietnamese case. The theory of the 
neo-patrimonial state seeks to capture situations in which a system for-
mally laid out in ‘legal-rational’ or ‘bureaucratic’ terms is supplanted and 
                                                 
5  Some of the relevant literature will be discussed below, but for some of the 
historic texts see, for instance, Porter 1993; Thayer 1995: 39–64; Dang Phong 
and Beresford 1998; Gainsborough 2003; Kerkvliet and Marr 2004; Kerkvliet 
2005; Gainsborough 2010a; Tai and Sidel 2013; London 2014; Vu 2017.  
6  See Finlayson and Martin (2006) for further background. One could speak here 
in terms of ‘authoritarian’ and ‘democratic’ states as another way to think about 
the state in Vietnam. However, I do not find this helpful, not least because the 
labels ‘authoritarian’ and ‘democratic’ assume too much about the state in Vi-
etnam (and so-called democratic states). I would argue that all states have dem-
ocratic and authoritarian features.  
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suffused by the exercise of power on more personal grounds. Scholars 
writing on the neo-patrimonial state often speak of a blurring of public 
and private, with decision making being influenced by personal relation-
ships and money. What follows, it is argued, is that state capacity, or ‘the 
ability to get thing done’, is undermined (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 
2009: 125–156). For anyone familiar with how decision-making occurs in 
Vietnam, where relationships and money are key, the connections are 
plain to see (Gainsborough, Dang Ngoc Dinh, and Tran Thanh Phuong 
2009). 
While the neo-patrimonial state has tended to be associated with 
sub-Saharan Africa, the developmental state has been associated with 
East and Southeast Asia. It describes, amongst other things, situations 
where state capacity is regarded as high, particularly in terms of designing 
and implementing economic policy and nurturing internationally com-
petitive firms (Leftwich 1995: 400–427). Developmental states, so the 
theory goes, have cohesive ‘developmental’ elites. Crucial here is the 
relationship between state and business, or state and society, with state 
actors needing (according to the theory) to stand sufficiently apart from 
societal or business actors in order to be able to ‘discipline’ and ‘direct’ 
them to achieve ‘developmental’ results. Peter Evans’ famously spoke 
about ‘embedded autonomy’, which sought to capture the way in which 
the state maintained autonomy in relation to, say, corporate actors (to be 
able to discipline them) whilst still having sufficiently close relations with 
them (to be able to direct them) (Evans 1995). Writers on the develop-
mental state have made a distinction between stronger and weaker states, 
which again underlines the fact that we are talking about a spectrum of 
capacity or developmentalism (Booth 1999: 301–321).  
When talking about state capacity, a distinction is sometimes made 
between states that may possess strong ‘coercive’ power but are weaker 
when it comes to ‘infrastructural’ power (McCormick 1999: 153–175). 
Infrastructural power is more the kind of power that developmental state 
theory is interested in, although a tendency towards repression is also 
noted as a feature of a developmental state. Recent scholarship has high-
lighted what appears to be a thin line between developmental and more 
predatory or corrupt state behaviour, and there is ongoing debate about 
whether states like China and Vietnam should be considered develop-
mental (Rock and Bonnett 2004: 999–1017). 
To conclude, I argue that ideas about neo-patrimonialism and de-
velopmentalism are useful – as a point of departure – as we think about 
how we want to characterise the state in Vietnam, and particularly as we 
explore the extent to which Vietnam scholarship has overstated the 
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power of the central state. However, both these theories have their limi-
tations and embody assumptions about the nature of the state which are 
ultimately misleading. I will return to this later in the article.  
I now turn to how scholars have spoken about the state in Vietnam, 
considering the ways in which they both align with and depart from the 
above framework. I start by looking at the writing of Benedict Kerkvliet, 
making connections with other Vietnam politics’ specialists. 
Pinning Down the Myth: What Kind of a Myth?  
In a 1995 article in the Journal of Asian Studies, Kerkvliet helpfully wrote 
that scholars had three different approaches when thinking about the 
state in Vietnam (Kerkvliet 1995). Kerkvliet repeated this analysis a dec-
ade later in a book-length study on agricultural collectivisation and decol-
lectivisation (Kerkvliet 2005). Kerkvliet named the first approach the 
‘dominating state’ approach. This approach stated (and remember that 
we are talking some years ago) that the key to understanding policymak-
ing and its implementation in Vietnam is to look at what state institu-
tions do (“the rules and programs governing Vietnam are monopolised 
within the state”, Kerkvliet writes).7 Writing in 2005, Kerkvliet associated 
this position with scholars like Gareth Porter, Carlyle Thayer and Brantly 
Womack.  
Kerkvliet referred to the second approach as “mobilizational corpo-
ratism”. In a refinement of the ‘dominating state’ approach, he argued 
that there is popular influence on the state, and on policy debates, but 
that it occurs through authorised channels established by the Party. A 
good example would be the Party-controlled mass organisations that 
represent different social groups (such as workers, farmers, women, 
students). Kerkvliet associates this approach with scholars like Yeonsik 
Jeong, Jonathan Stromseth and William Turley (Jeong 1997: 152–171; 
Stromseth 1998; Turley 1993). 
However, Kerkvliet was not satisfied with either approach; both, he 
wrote in 2005, focus on “official politics” or “the formal institutions of 
policymaking and implementation”. Even the second approach, which 
incorporates a sense of ‘advocacy politics’, only allows for the involve-
ment of state actors. The problem, Kerkvliet said, is that neither ap-
proach can account for what villagers (that is, the social group he was 
focusing on in his particular study) do outside official channels. Thus, 
neither approach can account for the difference between what the Party 
                                                 
7  The only exception being that some international influence is acknowledged.  
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or government says should happen and what villagers actually do. Nor, 
Kerkvliet continued, are these two approaches able to recognise that 
farmers may actually influence national politics, whether on account of 
unauthorised activity, corruption or incompetence. Kerkvliet also argued 
that this is exactly what happened, writing: 
Gradually, national authorities began to look differently at deviant 
local arrangements […] Between the late 1970s and 1980s, the 
Communist Party government incrementally adjusted its collectiv-
isation policy to accommodate aspects of those unauthorised 
practices instead of trying to expunge them. (Kerkvliet 2005: 35) 
Kerkvliet named this third approach to thinking about Vietnamese poli-
tics ‘dialogical’ (Kerkvliet 2005: 36). Dialogue, in the sense of communi-
cating ideas and preferences, continues between authorities and various 
sectors of society, and “is an important part of the system”, he said. This 
‘communication’ generally does not involve confrontation or much polit-
ical organisation, Kerkvliet argued, although it can sometimes escalate 
into unauthorised protest. He concluded:  
This dialogical interpretation of the political system recognises 
that the communist government’s capacity to coordinate programs 
and implement policies is considerably weaker than what a dominat-
ing state or mobilizational corporatist view would argue [italics 
added]. Activities not under the state’s control remain afoot and 
introduce discrepancies between what authorities claim and what 
actually occurs. Indeed, social forces and groups beyond the state 
can contribute to shift in policies. This interpretation also points 
out that authorities can adjust and change policies in the face of 
realities beyond their control. (Kerkvliet 2005: 36)  
While Kerkvliet’s study focused narrowly on decollectivisation, it points 
to what is generally the dominant approach to thinking about the Viet-
namese politics today, especially as the so-called ‘reform’ era has ad-
vanced. When Kerkvliet wrote his book, he identified a number of 
scholars he saw as writing in a similar vein to him (such as Ken Post, 
Kristin Pelzer, Hy Van Luong, Dara O’Rouke, Nigel Thrift and Dean 
Forbes, and Christine White).8 Moreover, it is easy to identify a newer 
generation of scholars who are also following in his footsteps (including 
                                                 
8  Post 1989; Pelzer 1993; Luong 1994; O’Rouke 2002; Thrift and Forbes 1986; 
and White 1985. Note that Kerkvliet also names Adam Fforde as writing in the 
dialogical approach. However, as will be explained later, we think this is mis-
taken.  
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David Koh, Thomas Sikor, and Andrew Wells-Dang) (see Koh 2000; 
Sikor 2004; and Wells-Dang 2014).  
Kerkvliet’s approach is of special interest in relation to this article, 
in that it could be read as pre-empting any notion of the myth of a cen-
tralised state. Is downplaying any notion of a centralised state not the 
very thing that Kerkvliet (and scholars like him) do? For instance, we 
saw in the dialogical approach how the state is not viewed as being as 
strong in contrast to the other two approaches, that activities outside the 
state’s control are viewed as widespread, and that the state is influenced 
by such activities. What myth of the centralised state, indeed, one might 
say! 
However, on closer inspection, it is evident that the situation is 
more complex. Looking again at the writing of Kerkvliet (and others) 
one can see how – paradoxically – the myth of the centralised state lives 
on, notwithstanding their attentiveness to localism or the activities of a 
wide array of societal actors. The dialogical approach does, of course, 
emphasise the importance of groups operating outside official channels, 
but at the same time, it (necessarily) assumes that the said ‘official chan-
nels’ exist and that it is meaningful to speak of them in this way. In other 
words, while emphasising the existence of social forces beyond the 
state’s control in one breath, the dialogical approach reifies the state in 
another (that is, turns the state into something it is not).9 Thus, Kerkvliet 
has no problem in asserting the importance of party and state structures 
in Vietnam. “These institutions and organizations,” he wrote, “are indeed 
major players in the story of agricultural collectivization and decollectiviza-
tion”. “It was national leaders,” he continued, “who decided the country 
had to collectivize” (Kerkvliet 2005: 34; italics added). Such an approach 
can be questioned. Thus, while the dialogical approach is clearly an im-
provement on the other two approaches, there is still a sense in which it 
claims too much. 
Once one is alert to what is going on, one can see the way in which 
the dialogical approach reifies the state at every turn. Central here is the 
                                                 
9  Reification implies a tendency to talk about the state as if it is unproblematic to 
do so, forgetting that the state is not a ‘thing’ but a powerful metaphysical ef-
fect, or what comes into view as a result of a series of practices through which 
social and political order is maintained. Thus, what we call ‘the state’ is, contra-
ry to the mainstream statist view, the outcome of political practices not just a 
contributor to them (that is, the state does not just ‘act on’ society or interact 
with it; that it appears this way is a metaphysical effect). Note that state reifica-
tion is identical to the idea of the statist bias discussed above on p. 2. These is-
sues are explored in more depth later in the article. 
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way in which party and state bodies are repeatedly named unproblemati-
cally (‘the state’, ‘the party’, etc.), that state institutions are studied with-
out sufficient attention to the political effects of studying them, and 
most importantly they are given agency.  
Consider the following examples taken from Kerkvliet: 
Through structures extending from Hanoi into most villages, party 
and government agencies built the collective cooperatives, carried out 
numerous campaigns […] and conducted other programs […] (italics 
added) 
In the late 1970s these agencies authorized modest shifts […] (ital-
ics added) 
[…] the Communist Party government stipulated […] Officials in 
party and government circles pondered…[and continuing into the 
1980s] national authorities look[ed] differently at [deviant local ar-
rangements …] (italics added). (Kerkvliet 2005: 34–36) 
Thus, as we can see, the state is taken at face value. It acts, and stating 
this is relatively unproblematic.10 
Moreover, it is not just Kerkvliet who has a tendency to reify the 
state; it is ubiquitous in Vietnam studies. Carlyle Thayer, who was origi-
nally associated with the dominating state approach, with his ideas of 
mono-organisational socialism, continues to attribute considerable agen-
cy to the ‘VCP’.11 This includes repeating in quite recent writing the age-
old trope of it having ‘adopted’ doi moi (reform) in 1986 (Thayer 2010: 
427). Tuong Vu, meanwhile, speaks repeatedly of ‘the Party’ ‘believing 
this’, ‘embracing that’ or ‘acting’ in this or that way. It is not that he de-
picts the state as monolithic – he does not – but the language he uses 
repeatedly serves to reify the state, or to treat it unproblematically. 
Therefore, it is possible to both speak about the state as not being 
monolithic and still to reify it (Vu 2016: 267–289).  
                                                 
10  On the issue of state institutions studied without sufficient attention to the 
political effects of studying them, the extensive research on Vietnam’s National 
Assembly is a case in point. See Malesky and Schuler 2008: 1–48, and Malesky, 
Schuler, and Anh Tran 2012: 762–786. 
11  It would appear that Thayer has not entirely abandoned his attachment to 
mono-organisational socialism. In 2016, he spoke of a “weakening of Vi-
etnam’s mono-organisational system”, implying it still has some salience, while 
in 2010 he said that ‘political organisations’ formed between 2004 and 2006 had 
no “official standing in Vietnam’s system of mono-organisational socialism”, 
again seemingly suggested this system is still current in his view. See Thayer 
2016: 3–4; and Thayer 2010: 437. 
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Furthermore, even scholars who are deeply attentive to localism 
and/or social activism do not hesitate to talk in terms of ‘the central 
state’, ‘state objectives’, or what ‘the Party-state allows’, and they also 
frequently attribute it considerable power (see Sikor 2004; Wells-Dang 
2014; and Koh 2004). For instance, Andrew Wells-Dang, writing in 2014, 
argued that the initiative in terms of change had shifted to “actors out-
side of state structures”, but he added that the Party-state still holds a 
“very strong position” (Wells-Dang 2014: 180). Again, the argument 
being made here is that scholars need to be more careful in terms of how 
they speak about the state. I will return to why I say this shortly, but first 
let me sum up in terms of the argument so far.  
In light of the preceding discussion, it is possible to state more pre-
cisely the nature of the myth being explored. The myth of the central 
state in Vietnam is not simply a debate about whether the state is strong-
er or weaker in terms of its ability to do things, although this is part of it. 
Rather, the myth of the central state embodies the idea that even to 
speak of the state in the more cautious way that the dialogical approach 
does is to distort or mislead in terms of what is actually ‘out there’. It is 
(still) to perpetuate an illusion.  
One way to establish what I mean by this is to ask the question of 
why the myth of the centralised state exists. It is to this that I now turn. 
The Myth of the Centralised State: Why Does It 
Occur?  
To answer the question of why the myth of the centralised state occurs, 
it is important to be clear what exactly it is we are seeking to explain. I 
have offered two possibilities, both of which I believe are important. The 
first possibility, which was mentioned in the introduction, is simply that 
the myth involves over-stating the degree to which there is a coherent 
central body directing things in Vietnam. The state is weak and even the 
dialogical approach, while an improvement, does not get this completely 
right. 
The second possibility is that even to speak of a weaker state in Vi-
etnam – a state that would do things if only it could – embodies a mis-
understanding of the nature of the state. That is, even amongst those 
who are attentive to localism or the vibrancy of diverse social groups 
(the dialogical approach), a process of reification is taking place. This too 
is a key element of the myth that needs explaining.  
So, with these two elements of the myth in mind, let us now move 
to the question of explanation. The discussion has three parts to it. First, 
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I look at the political interests served by the myth. Second, I look at the 
role Vietnam’s socialist legacy has played in reinforcing the myth. Lastly, 
I consider post-structuralist ideas about the state, notably the statist bias. 
This third area is explored in some detail as these ideas are crucial to the 
argument being advanced. 
Elite Interests 
To explain the existence, and persistence, of the myth of the centralised 
state, we need to consider the interests that might be served by it. The 
first set of interests that are relevant here are those belonging to Viet-
namese elites, particularly those who hold party or state positions, or are 
in some way connected to the party-state. The body that they inhabit has 
“self-preserving” and “self-aggrandizing” tendencies (Anderson 1983). It 
aids those who hold political office to be able to assert that ‘the state’ or 
‘the party’ is in control, is wisely directing things, and making decisions. 
Doing so boosts their domestic legitimacy and their international stand-
ing. Thus, a key reason why the myth of a centralised state exists is be-
cause it serves domestic political interests. The myth is intimately bound 
up in the way in which the story of doi moi is told, namely that the party 
made a series of ‘wise’ decisions beginning in the 1980s to bring about 
change. Of course, there are various caveats or refinements in the schol-
arly literature relating to this controlling narrative, including in Kerk-
vliet’s analysis (Kerkvliet 1995). However, notwithstanding these adjust-
ments, the narrative keeps resurfacing, as we saw above. Moreover, as 
the years go by, and the state’s grip on what happens weakens, there is a 
sense in which Vietnamese elites are needing to assert the ‘intentionality’ 
of doi moi with new vigour (Fforde 2012: 5, note 3).  
Of course, it is not just about domestic interests; the myth of the 
central state also serves foreign interests. For instance, it is not difficult 
to see how Western geo-political and commercial interests associated 
with Vietnam drive the myth, trumping even periodically expressed mis-
givings about the nature of Vietnam’s politics. Such dynamics are clearly 
at play in respect of the international aid community; for instance, main-
taining project aid even when agreed objectives are not met (Gainsbor-
ough, Dang Ngoc Dinh, and Tran Thanh Phuong 2009). Against this 
backdrop, it is easier – and prudent – for foreign elites to buy into the 
narrative of reform, which, as we have seen, incorporates the myth of 
the central state. In 2012, Adam Fforde wrote about how foreign embas-
sies in Vietnam were content to go along with the idea that the Com-
munist Party is a coherent political force because doing so aligned with 
the interests of their governments (Fforde 2013a: 107). Furthermore, it is 
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not just foreign governments, multilateral institutions or international 
business for whom the myth of the central state need not be questioned 
as they pursue their interests. Rather, it is important to be alert to the 
way in which foreign scholarship can also align with such interests and 
hence perpetuate the myth.  
To sum up, I have argued that the myth of the centralised state in 
Vietnam persists because it serves both domestic and foreign elite inter-
ests. Indeed, I have suggested that these interests are relatively close, 
notwithstanding formal differences in political systems (Gainsborough 
2010b: 447–460). However, while understanding the interests behind the 
myth is important, there is more to say.  
The Legacy of Socialism 
Another element to explaining the myth of the centralised state in Vi-
etnam, which is worthy of attention, relates to the word ‘Socialist’ in this 
article’s title. Many would argue that Vietnam is now post-Socialist and 
that, regardless of what has been said officially, socialism plays very little 
part in Vietnam’s present (nor is it likely to play a part in its future) (Tay-
lor 2016). That said, the country’s socialist heritage may have played a 
small part in explaining the myth, particularly in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Historically, Vietnam has been grouped with other Communist 
countries, notably the Soviet Union and China, with the implication that 
these countries had something in common on account of their shared 
socialist heritage. Thayer captured this way of thinking clearly when he 
wrote: 
Up until the mid-1980s, it was common to analyse Vietnam’s po-
litical system in the context of comparative communism. Vietnam 
was compared with the Soviet Union and China because it had 
modelled its constitution and political institutions on these states. 
(Thayer 1995: 44) 
It is this perspective that lies behind Thayer’s adoption of the term 
mono-organisational socialism – the term itself coming from a compara-
tive communism scholar called T. H. Rigby. While Thayer seems reluc-
tant to abandon mono-organisational socialism today, he is also clear 
that it applied in North Vietnam after 1954 and that the ‘model’ was 
‘imposed’ on the South after 1975 (Thayer 1995: 46). Although this is 
beyond the scope of the present article, recent scholarship has suggested 
that even asserting that the dominating state approach once had salience 
in Vietnam is less certain (Fforde 2009b: 484–504). However, the point 
is that Vietnam’s ‘Socialist’ heritage may have left a legacy, such that 
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foreign observers projected certain expectations on Vietnamese institu-
tions – of capacity and order – simply because they bore a passing re-
semblance to their counterpart institutions in other current and former 
Communist states.12 That said, as outsiders have had greater access to 
Vietnam, notably since the 1990s, the significance of this legacy has 
ebbed. Moreover, we can safely say that the myth of the centralised state 
in Vietnam would not exist if it did not serve domestic and foreign inter-
ests. 
The Statist Bias 
While the above points are important, we cannot stop here in terms of 
explaining the myth of the centralised state in Vietnam. As I have argued, 
the myth is not just about a tendency to attribute too much coherence or 
authority to Vietnamese institutions. Even among those who offer a 
more nuanced picture of state capacity (in the dialogical approach, for 
example), there is still a process of state reification taking place, which 
depicts the state in a way which is misleading (and in turn perpetuates 
the myth).  
I will look at how we might move beyond the myth in the next sec-
tion. However, I first need to shed light on this alternative approach to 
thinking about the state. To do this, I will make a brief foray into post-
structuralist writing on the state since it is this body of literature that 
discusses reification, or what is often referred to as ‘the statist bias’.  
The notion of the statist bias involves an assertion that all is not as 
it seems with reference to the state, or the more usual ways it is depicted. 
That is, the suggestion in post-structuralist writing is that some of how 
we think about the state – what we think we see – is an illusion. A pio-
neering thinker in this regard is Timothy Mitchell, who described ‘the 
state’ as the “powerful, metaphysical effect” of practices that make it 
appear to have a real perimeter and hence distinct from society (Mitchell 
1991: 77–96). The key point is that the state is not an entity with a real 
perimeter, like, say, a table. Rather, it is a conceptual abstraction. The 
statist bias involves not recognising this and hence viewing the appear-
ance that the state stands apart from society, and intervenes in it, as un-
questionably how it is. To take our understanding of the myth of the 
centralised state in Vietnam to a new level, it is important to understand 
                                                 
12  Joel Migdal, writing in 1988, described Vietnam as a ‘strong state’ alongside 
China, Cuba, North Korea, Israel, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea; see Migdal 
1988. This is a good example of the logic of the socialist label I am discussing.  
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this perspective and to consider the possibilities it opens up in terms of 
moving beyond the myth.13  
Post-structuralist ideas about the state do not mean suggesting that 
the state does not exist. This would clearly be a mistake. With reference 
to Vietnam, there is clearly an apparatus of some kind, with party and 
state bodies stretching from the capital to the village. However, a post-
structuralist approach emphasises the importance of taking the elusive-
ness of the state-society boundary seriously, not as a point of “conceptu-
al precision” – as so many scholars do – but as a clue to how rule occurs. 
Being circumspect about what the state is, and hence distinguishing be-
tween appearance and reality, enables us to acknowledge the power of 
the political arrangements that we call ‘the state’, while at the same time 
accounting for their elusiveness. Central here is not to view the distinc-
tion between state and society as a boundary between two distinct enti-
ties but rather as a “line drawn internally within the network of institu-
tional mechanisms through which a social and political order is main-
tained” (Mitchell 1991: 78). Post-structuralist writers argue that the abil-
ity to have an internal distinction appear as though it is an external 
boundary between separate objects is central to how rule occurs. It also 
accounts, at least in part, for the state’s longevity as a political form.  
While Mitchell is one of the most illuminating writers on this sub-
ject, other scholars can be seen as rejecting the statist bias as well. Alan 
Finlayson and James Martin, for example, refer to ‘the state’ not as a 
“thing” but as “a practice or ensemble of practices” (Finlayson and Mar-
tin 2006: 155). Like Mitchell, Finlayson and Martin also refer to the state 
as the “outcome of political activities as well as a contribution to them” 
(Finlayson and Martin 2006: 155). Statist writing – like that on Vietnam – 
tends only to see the state as contributing to political outcomes ‘as an 
actor’, and hence neglects the fact that ‘the state’ – what we see – is also 
an outcome of political activities.  
Continuing some of these same themes, Richard Ashley speaks of 
the “figure” of the sovereign state as “nothing more and nothing less 
than an arbitrary political representation always in the process of being 
inscribed within history, through practice” (Ashley 1988: 227–262). 
While Ashley’s wider point is that the “orderly” national realm on which 
                                                 
13  While I have focused on post-structuralist notions of the state, I am also aware 
of Marxist-inspired perspectives on the state (e.g., Nicos Poulantzas), which al-
so question the usual ‘statist’ positions. This simply reflects where the weight of 
the author’s research on the state has fallen. However, readers who wish to 
draw on the Marxist and post-Marxist tradition in terms of state theory may 
wish to see Hay 2006: 59–78; and Jessop 2015.  
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the “anarchic” international realm is thought to rest is not quite as order-
ly as people think, the key point for our purposes is, again, that our per-
ception that ‘the state’ has clear boundaries and stands apart from ‘socie-
ty’ is misleading. Put like this, it is possible to see how the dialogical 
approach, with its emphasis on state-society relations, has its limitations 
(that is, the dialogical approach does not problematise these issues at all). 
Furthermore, it is worth emphasising that what post-structuralists 
say regarding how we understand the state and its ‘boundary’ with socie-
ty is very different from the more usual ‘statist’ interpretation, which 
suggests that a ‘fuzzy’ boundary between state and society is a sign of a 
weak or neo-patrimonial state that is ‘corrected’ in ‘advanced’ or ‘devel-
opmental’ states. Therefore, both neo-patrimonial and developmental 
approaches to the state can be seen to fall victim to the statist bias, so a 
more rigorous theorisation of the state is needed if we are to go beyond 
them.  
Alongside viewing the appearance that ‘the state’ stands apart from 
‘society’ as ‘reality’, scholars have noted a similar tendency in respect of 
reifying the ‘public’ and ‘private’ realms; that is, taking the appearance 
that they are separate and distinct as how it actually is. Peter Bratsis 
wrote of how we often end up believing that there “truly are” two dis-
tinct modes of existence, namely public and private, when as with state 
and society, it is purely a conceptual distinction. Tracing the emergence 
of this way of perceiving the rise of the nation-state, Bratsis says that 
while we know that a person holding public office only has “one body”, 
“we act ‘as if’ we did not know”, clinging to the idea that a person can 
move seamlessly between ‘public’ and ‘private’, with ‘the public’ auto-
matically “devoid” of personal or other interests. Bratsis calls this the 
“fetish of the public”, namely where we treat something as if it is not 
what it actually is (Bratsis 2006: 47). This, in effect, is the same point that 
Mitchell and others make about how scholars commonly view ‘the state’. 
For Bratsis, the ‘public’ sphere is actually an impossibility because it 
can never be purged of private interests. This leads to some novel ideas 
regarding how we understand ‘the state’, the ‘public’ realm, and indeed 
‘corruption’. For instance, on Bratsis’s reading, contemporary anti-cor-
ruption practices never really seek to purge ‘the private’ from ‘the public’, 
despite claims to the contrary. Instead, they aim to establish boundaries 
between what constitutes a “normal presence of the private within the 
abstract body of the public and what constitutes a pathological presence”. 
Bratsis continued:  
The language of corruption has had the historical effect of creat-
ing a large and legally regulated series of practices that legitimise 
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the unavoidable and systemic presence of private interests in the 
‘body politic’ by treating only some forms of this presence as be-
ing a subversion of the public by the private. (Bratsis 2006)  
Bratsis illustrated his account with an analysis of political party donations 
and lobbying rules, noting the entirely arbitrary nature of the cut-offs in 
relation to what is permissible and what is not. For example, why must a 
donation to a British political party over GBP 5,000 be registered in the 
name of the donor, but not if it is under GBP 5,000 (as detailed in the 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000)? For Bratsis, it is 
all about appearances. He wrote:   
Given the impossibility of removing ‘private interests’ from […] 
the real bodies of public servants […] a series of rules and practic-
es is instituted in order to purge the realm of appearances from 
acts that challenge the categorization of society as divided into 
two mutually exclusive registers, the public and private. (Bratsis 
2006: 67)  
In light of the preceding analysis, it is evident that what we call ‘the state’, 
or think of as the ‘public’ sphere, or as ‘corruption’, is not as stable or 
self-evident as we commonly think. Echoing this point, Finlayson and 
Martin talked about ‘the state’ as having an “evolving and unpredictable 
character”, always facing the “possibility of conflict and potential dis-
aggregation”, and continually confronting “resistance to its efforts”. 
They noted that this often happens as a result of the state’s own activi-
ties, which themselves expose the partiality and contingency of its claims 
(for example, officials being caught with their ‘hands in the till’) (Finlay-
son and Martin 2006: 162 and 164). Bratsis, meanwhile, wrote that the 
state lives with the constant threat that the “real impossibility of the 
public” will be exposed (Bratsis 2006: 52). Mitchell made a similar point, 
noting how once the state is seen as ‘metaphysical effect’, it no longer 
has the “coherence, agency, and subjectivity” that the term usually pre-
supposes (Mitchell 1991: 90).  
However, there is a considerable amount riding on the state not be-
ing seen as arbitrary, or the impossibility of the public sphere not being 
revealed. Bratsis wrote of the threat posed to “the entire conceptual 
framework that supports the state and capitalist productive relations” if 
the true nature of the public realm is exposed (Bratsis 2006: 52). Similarly, 
Mitchell argued that the appearance of state and society as separate 
things is part of the way social, political and economic order is main-
tained (Mitchell 1991: 90). Consequently, anything that undermines the 
idea of the state as a distinct and bounded entity separate from society, 
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or anything that interferes with the idea of the public realm being devoid 
of private interests, tends to be side-lined.14 This explains the relative 
unpopularity of post-structuralist ideas in both public and academic life. 
However, they are critical to understanding the myth of the centralised 
state, not just in Vietnam but across the world.  
As citizens, scholars, officials and practitioners, we are very good at 
policing ourselves by, for example, not mentioning, denying, or reinter-
preting practices that do not fit with a clearly demarcated ‘state’ or ‘pub-
lic’ realm. However, once the statist bias is understood, it becomes obvi-
ous that empirical data on Vietnam, commonly interpreted with refer-
ence to a statist approach, fits much more easily with an approach that 
rejects the statist bias. Only by embracing this alternative ‘non-statist’ 
approach will we be able to correct for the myth of the centralised state. 
Let us now look at what this alternative approach looks like.  
Going beyond the Myth: Rethinking the State in 
Vietnam 
It is not at all easy to break free of the statist bias. As we have seen, the 
state, by its very nature, has colonised our minds. Consequently, it re-
quires persistent intellectual effort and commitment to step outside the 
old paradigm and to inhabit the new one. However, it can be done. In an 
attempt to tease out the precise nature of this ‘non-statist’ approach, I 
now consider my own work in this area and work by Adam Fforde. Hav-
ing done this, I will conclude. 
In my 2010 book on Vietnamese politics, I spoke of a method for 
studying the state that, paradoxically, involves not focusing attention 
directly on the state. I argued that to do so “risk[s] defining the object of 
our study in advance”. Instead, I said that we need to try and “surrender 
any preconceptions as to what the state is”, trusting that a “more authen-
tic picture” will eventually come into view in light of our empirical work 
(Gainsborough 2010a: 177). While there is probably more to say about 
how exactly a ‘more authentic’ picture will come into view, there is im-
mediately a sense of contingency about the state in that work. Central to 
my approach is a commitment to looking at ‘actors’ – whether formally 
inhabiting ‘the state’ or not – considering “their games, their strategies, 
their historical practices”, and seeing what this tells us about ‘the political’ 
                                                 
14  A good example is the so-called MPs expenses scandal in the UK parliament in 
2009, which was followed by a vigorous attempt by certain political elites to re-
instate appearances that parliament was ‘clean’. See Gainsborough (2011). 
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and ultimately ‘the state’ (the quote here is from Hibou 2004: 21). Hav-
ing often studied business as a window onto the state, I argue that this is 
really to ask how people act politically. Thus, my work contains an un-
willingness to take the state as a given. For me, the state is unstable and I 
cannot be entirely sure what it is. This is very different from the dialogi-
cal or state-society approach.  
I have also questioned the notion that politics is about policymaking, 
famously arguing in an analysis of the Tenth Communist Party National 
Congress in 2006 that politics was about ‘all about spoils’ (that is, who 
gets the jobs and in turn access to patronage and money) (Gainsborough 
2007). While a full discussion of this is beyond the scope of this article, 
this too sets my approach apart from the mainstream, which focuses 
heavily on politics as being about policy.15 
A similar commitment to not taking the state for granted, and hence 
probing its elusiveness, can be found in Adam Fforde’s work. Fforde is 
best known for his work on the transition from the planned to the mar-
ket economy. In particular, he popularised the Vietnamese term translat-
ed as ‘fence-breaking’ (pha rao) to capture the way in which the emer-
gence of the market economy was primarily driven by spontaneous mar-
ketisation or ‘bottom-up’ processes whereby farmers or state enterprises 
took it upon themselves to operate outside of the planned economy. 
This, Fforde says, dates back to North Vietnam in the 1960s (that is, well 
before so-called ‘reforms’ or doi moi in 1986, and hence rejecting the idea 
that Vietnam was ever a centralised state). This leads Fforde to empha-
sise what he calls ‘endogenous’ drivers of change as distinct from ‘policy’, 
the importance of which he, like myself, also downplays. Policy is not 
unimportant for Fforde but he argues that it is frequently reactive to 
events rather than determining of them. Summing up his position, he 
says that his account seeks to break free from one that privileges the 
Vietnamese Communist Party as the author of change in favour of a 
“wide range of diverse independent actors” (Fforde 2009b: 484). Thus, 
Fforde says that Vietnam’s economy was, in effect, ‘auto-reformed’.16 
It would be easy to mistake Fforde’s approach as being identical to 
the dialogical approach, and a number of scholars have invoked him in 
this way (see Kerkvliet 2005: 36, and Sikor 2004: 168). However, while 
                                                 
15  I saw this with reference to Kerkvliet’s dialogical approach. See also Malesky 
and Schuler 2008 and Malesky, Schuler, and Tran 2012 for a heavy focus on 
politics as being about policy. 
16  Fforde 2009c: 674. Note that Fforde eschews the notion of ‘correct’ policy, 
preferring the question of whether it works, where ‘it’ might be policy-related 
but may be more spontaneous. 
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there may be some overlap, the dialogical approach does not talk about 
‘auto-reform’. 17  Moreover, Fforde, like Gainsborough, is much more 
circumspect about what ‘the state’ is compared to mainstream approach-
es. Writing in 2011, Fforde argued that there is a crisis of the “meaning 
of political authority” in Vietnam, which he saw as having become pro-
gressively worse since the mid-1990s (Fforde 2011: 167–168). He ques-
tioned the grounds upon which the party-state rules and to what ends, 
and he finds senior Vietnamese asking similar questions too (Fforde 
2013b: 19). Moreover, he continued, if anyone was to ask how to under-
stand the “very nature of the state [in Vietnam] – its ontology”, they 
would not “receive a satisfactory answer” (Fforde 2011: 168). Again, this 
puts clear blue water between Fforde and the dialogical approach.  
Until around 1997, Fforde argued that there was still enough “re-
sidual authority” in the system for the party-state to be able to exercise 
power in the event of a crisis. However, 10 years later even this could 
not be guaranteed. By the mid-2000s, the party-state was “far from the 
people”, he said, and highly corrupt (Fforde 2011: 166). Indeed, echoing 
my own arguments, Fforde argued that the party-state was increasingly 
just a vehicle for powerful people to pursue their interests, adding that 
the Party-state exhibits no clear developmental rationale for its activities, 
much less follow-through. As Fforde said, “the higher levels instruct, the 
lower levels don’t listen” (tren bao duoi khong nghe) (Fforde 2009a: 74). 
While those who follow the dialogical approach may say that they know 
this, there is still a qualitative difference between Fforde’s account and 
theirs.  
Once one takes Fforde’s and my ideas on board, it is striking how 
‘rather awkward’ empirical data found in so many accounts of Vietnam-
ese politics, which has been shoe-horned into a statist approach, can be 
seen to fit much more easily with a non-statist approach. As Bratsis said, 
the private cannot be purged from the public. Rather, it is about main-
taining rules and practices that purge the realm of appearances of acts 
that challenge the categorisation of society as divided into ‘public’ and 
‘private’. The point is that the state in Vietnam is not doing this very well 
and that it has become worse since the late 1990s.18  
                                                 
17  Recall how Kerkvliet emphasised ‘state decisions’, societal activity notwith-
standing.  
18  Candidates for this kind of rethinking include Kerkvliet’s work but also that of 
Wells-Dang 2014 and many of the chapters in Kerkvliet and Marr’s (2004) edit-
ed book Beyond Hanoi. However, this is work still to be done. This article merely 
seeks to point the way to a fourth ‘non-statist’ approach to studying politics in 
contrast to the dialogical one. 
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Conclusion 
I began this article with three questions. First, I asked about the nature 
of the myth of a centralised Socialist state in Vietnam and how it mani-
fests itself; second, I asked if the myth changes over time; and lastly, I 
asked why the myth endures. In light of the findings of this chapter, it is 
now possible to offer a more comprehensive answer to all three ques-
tions. Having done this, I will consider the implications of my findings 
for contemporary actors, including the international development com-
munity. 
In terms of the nature of the myth and the way in which it mani-
fests itself, I have argued that there is a tendency to reify the state, even 
in writing which is attentive to localism and the diversity of societal ac-
tors at play in Vietnamese political life. Thus, even the dialogical ap-
proach to thinking about politics overstates the power of the state be-
cause it takes the state too much for granted and is not sufficiently alert 
to the way in which, at a certain level, the state is an illusion. It is not that 
we cannot or should not have debates about state capacity; both Fforde’s 
approach and my own allow for this. However, we will understand ‘the 
state’ much better if we remember that it is, by definition, ontologically 
unstable. 
On the question of whether the myth changes over time, we can say 
that the myth itself does not change very much. What may change (a 
little) is how scholars talk about the state. However, this article has 
shown how even the dialogical approach, while an improvement on the 
dominating state approach, still falls victim to the statist bias and is 
therefore distorting. Specifically, in contrast to Fforde’s and my non-
statist approach, the dialogical approach does not offer scope to raise 
questions about whether, in certain circumstances, it is meaningful to 
speak about ‘the state’ at all. 
I have argued that the myth of the central state endures because 
there are domestic and foreign political interests that depend on it, both 
for reasons of legitimacy and because of commercial and geo-political 
interests. There is a lot riding on the myth. However, more fundamental-
ly, the myth endures because of the power of the state to colonise our 
minds such that even when the empirical data does not fit with the idea 
of the state, we make it fit. 
The remaining issue is for us to explore the implications of these 
findings, both for academics and for practitioners, notably those in the 
international development community. Starting with the academic com-
munity, I have argued that nearly all writing on politics in Vietnam suf-
fers from the statist bias, and this includes the dialogical approach as well 
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as neo-patrimonial and developmental state approaches. Therefore, there 
is huge scope for scholars to revisit the way in which they write about 
politics and development and to engage seriously with post-structural 
ideas about the state. To date, there has been a notable lacuna in this 
respect, and it is time we filled it. Further refinement of a non-statist 
approach to thinking about politics is the way forward. 
For practitioners, including those in the international development 
community, it would be to their advantage if they could be attentive to 
non-statist approaches to thinking about politics. However, there is a lot 
riding on the statist paradigm being maintained, as I have discussed. 
Moreover, it is quite difficult for practitioners to operate successfully if 
they do not fall in line with the arbitrary political representations around 
which we order our lives. (All of us must do this to some extent.) Instead, 
the issue is more one of how, given the analysis contained in this article, 
practitioners might approach engaging with the different actors and 
institutions they encounter in Vietnam. This is clearly a vast subject, 
which would merit further discussion. However, the following points 
seem worth bearing in mind. First, there is the issue of institutional par-
ticularism. That is, what comprises ‘the state’ in Vietnam rarely moves in 
the same direction, rarely works together, and rarely sings from the same 
hymn sheet. Moreover, no one in Vietnam – however elevated – ever 
has it all sewn up; that is, there is always someone who may potentially 
stand in your way. Second, things are rarely as they seem. While elites 
may talk about ‘policy’ or ‘development’ or ‘inclusive growth’, it is (at 
present) fundamentally about spoils (money, patronage and relationships) 
and all interactions are conducted with an eye to this. It is essential to be 
aware of this point. Moreover, as Fforde says, it is increasingly unclear in 
Vietnam what political power is for, and the lack of clarity cannot last for 
ever. Finally, any notion that there is order or coherence in Vietnam 
because it is a one-party Communist state is about as wrong as it could be. 
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